suffer from an element of unpredictability due to a lack of direct control. 6 The practical implementation of such approaches also became more flexible and delegative.ĭespite being strategically pragmatic, this flexibility and delegation mean that Russia’s influence attempts in the U.K. 5 A more confrontational approach ultimately emerged, of conceptually and practically undermining key institutions, mirroring what Russian political and military elites perceived “competitor” states in the West to be doing.
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From the promotion of positive representations of Russia to counter what was perceived as the West’s information manipulation, 4 effective representation of Russia evolved into a national security concern. has evolved in line with a broader strategic evolution combining foreign, military, and security policy diplomacy and informational/technical capabilities. Throughout Russian President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia’s approach to its activities in the U.K. In pursuing these “influence attempts” in the U.K., Russian state actors have used both targeted tactics and opportunistic interventions, while independent actors pursuing their own interests have also produced incidental benefits for the Russian state. The main pillars of the strategy for achieving this objective are: infiltrating networks of social, economic, and political influence promoting the destabilization of norm and value hierarchies, including in ways that create sympathy for Russian alternatives and ensuring targeted informational and narrative support for specific Russian foreign policy priorities.
![warfare 1917 new study hall warfare 1917 new study hall](http://pages.nxtbook.com/allen/cmag/22-Spring2017/iphone/cmag-22-sprg17-ds_p0025_midres.jpg)
can be summarized as cultivating an atmosphere conducive to increasing Russia’s influence there - whether in absolute or relative terms. Russia’s main strategic priority for the U.K. 3 Successful policy responses, by contrast, must address a fundamentally messier reality. In the United Kingdom, then, it is counterproductive to militarize Russia’s specific activities as forms of hybrid or informational “warfare.” This suits Russian interests by overplaying the state’s capabilities 2 and exaggerating the coherence and control underlying processes and outcomes.
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What is more, different “permission sets” apply 1 - targeted military force cannot be used to back up psychological operations, for instance. Russia’s strategic priorities for established international centers of power differ significantly from those that apply in countries within its cultural, geographic, or linguistic influence.